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On such a full sea are we now afloat,  
And we must take the current when it serves, 
Or lose our ventures. 
William Shakespeare 
   
The two-dimensional, both content and spatial, prognostic language can help to overcome the 
one-track minded character of some macro-economic models. It requires an analysis of spatial 
hierarchy and of interaction (co-operation, contradiction) between its levels. Our view of 
Russian economic future is a combination of at least two views: from above / outside and from 
below / inside Russia. The first view concerns the need of Russia’s economic adaptation to the 
new global trends and international competition. The second approach deals with regional and 
local specifics, inequalities and technological, informational and social adjustment abilities. 
A cyclic-synergetic concept of global economic development since 1800 (graphs will de applied 
to the report) hardly needs many comments. Three questions are under discussion:  
•  If the dynamics, accompanied by deepening international gaps (in spite of decolonization 
etc.), will diminish them in the early 21st century? 
•  Does an acceleration compress a standard Kondratieff wave to some 35-40 years, at what 
spatial scale (local, national or international) this occurs, and what price (political and 
financial mobilisation, social discontent or cultural uniformity) the skippers pay for? 
•   What will be the technical and spatial base of the next (up or downward) Kuznets in the 
current fifth Kondratieff (2000-25)? 
We start from the assumption that the known inertia, together with the law of ‘necessary 
variety’, prevent the international division of labour from dramatic shifts during at least a quarter 
of this century. Neither the booming Asian and other NIC nor the incomes of oil exporters, nor 
a neo-Keynesian economics disagree with the fact that the information, R & D and, most 
probably, bio-tech based economy restrict the number of the most developed nations.
i To join their elite club will be as hard as before for Russia (like anybody), while the number of 
semiperipheral “middle class” competitors will grow. 
The global economic crises depends on the mentioned gaps and instability of the post-Breton-
Woods monetary system. The chain of financial crises (Mexico-1985, SE Asia-1997, Russia-
1998, Argentine-2001) forms the environment in which Russia’s economy found itself after 
January 1992. Some growth of less developed economies and personal incomes (up to the UN 
‘basic needs’ level) may diminish the risk of future crises. For all that, the ‘southern’ claim on the 
‘North’ may be readdressed to the rich strata inside the ‘South’ proper. Moreover, the abrupt 
fall of the American realty and car demand will quickly lead to collapse the US and then, 
according to the dominoes principle, the whole World economy.  
For all worth of anti-consumerism for the destiny of Biosphere and Mankind, there will be a 
long transition to an ecology-based economic era when, say, Russia (as a ‘great environmental 
power’) would be able to enrich itself at the expense of its fresh waters, and atmosphere, etc. 
Many compensatory mechanisms must be gradually introduced during decades to prevent the 
crisis of an impetuous transition a sort of which has been recently tested in our country. 
Anyway, global economic cyclicity affects the prospects of Russian export sectors. In this 
context, the nature of the nearest half-Kondratieff acquires an applied significance: if it is an 
uprising stage, the oil, gas, metals, fertilisers and other Russian exporters’ prices will grow or 
remain high; if not, their incomes may go down.  
Strategic priorities also matter. The scientific community has few doubts about the global 
economic system in the 19th and 20th centuries, but again three questions remain disputable: 
•  Do the long-term growth indices of advanced countries depend on their individual features 
rather than on common and global socio-economic trends? 
•  Which long-term economic strategy was and is more adequate for the less developed 
nations, a pro-export one or an import substitution? 
•  Were there one single world market or the two different, capitalist and ‘socialist’? To answer the first question, an empirical regression between the unified sample of 16 DC 
1870-1989 growth rates (from Maddison, 1991) and dummy variables for each state was 
found. The analysis revealed the key role of common and temporal factors, together with 
general economic levelling within the DC team (higher rates of less developed) in comparison 
with their specific indices, though varying . 
The second question has been subject of discussions, especially rough in larger developing 
countries during the last 50 years. The results for near 100 states, even more different in terms 
of space, population, resource and R & D potentials, demonstrate the evident priority of an 
aggressive export-oriented strategy and a subsidiary role of the import substituting activities, 
although each national industry depends on its own cost-profit ratios.
ii 
The third question was extremely important for former Russia. In contrast to I.Wallerstein 
(1979) who denied the dual world economic system (with no statistical analysis), we argue that 
an ‘Eastern block market’ based on state monopoly of foreign-trade and on its own price 
system (only partly connected with the western) did exist during the Cold War decades. It 
collapsed in 1989, with the ‘world-based pricing’ in the former COMECON accounts, and 
then in the USSR in 1992, with general economic liberalization and a havoc in  the Soviet 
system of low-level wages, costs and prices. 
The system affected economy, everyday life, settlement and communication systems since the 
early 1930s when the ordinary financial instruments and ratios (between the sectors, labour 
productivity and consumption, domestic and external markets, rouble and foreign currencies, 
etc.)  fell victims to the values of forced industrialisation. For its well-known defects, the low-
cost system was not only arbitrary but tended to a strange balance and harmony. For instance, 
cheap consumer goods were balanced by low wages; cheap energy defined low transportation 
tariffs which promoted strong integration of the Soviet economic and social space.
iii  The intra-
COMECON trade had similar multilateral economic and monetary instruments based on the so 
called ‘transfer rouble’ the exchange rate of which still is disputable. The accounts in world 
prices and hard currency since 1989 resulted in disequilibrium and conflict around old debts or 
in barter transactions (up to 20 percent of the intra-CIS turnover).  Today, the third question can attract mostly historians, as some 85 percent of reported Russian 
exports and 70 percent of imports are hard currency paid. Russia was one of the first in the 
post-Soviet space to turn its external trade toward the West. At the same time, the transitional 
price system, with its disequilibrium not between demand and supply but between different 
supply prices (on the one side of the equations) has no adequate description in the world 
economics. Such a discord is rooted in an extremely uneven inflation the champions of which 
were the  natural monopolies and exporters. During the 1990-98 period of continuous 
industrial decline, the electric power sector had been a steady inflator which compensated each 
percent (20 in total) of its physical production losses by 512-fold price rise. The light industries, 
facing the sharpest competition of imported goods, could compensate each of its 88 percent of 
loss by a 4-fold inflation. Hence, the primary sectors have become much more notable in the 
Russian industrial structure affected by a thirdworldization. 
The sectorally uneven price race was accompanied by growing spatial disparities characteristic 
of Russia. Regions in one country where prices and incomes of ordinary goods and services 
differ by a factor of 10, 20 or more are unknown in Europe. Budgetary gaps separated the 
smaller group of donor regions from the majority of recipients. The runaway inflation of fuel and 
energy prices soon elevated transportation costs and tariffs and pushed many local markets to 
autarky. The former low-price system supported distant links, supply of the Far North, and 
mass tourism, etc. The unstable transitional system oppress them and questions the very 
existence of the domestic air and water transports.        
After the 1998 crisis Russian monopolists agreed to curb domestic energy and transportation 
tariffs. Then the cost-pushed inflation in industries lagged behind the sellers’ prices which 
stimulated manufacturers, but soon the growth of world prices and border gradients  resulted in 
series of ‘petrol’ and other contraband crises.
iv Both gradients and shadow exports, together 
with the problem of socially unacceptable domestic tariffs, still exist today.  
New prices, property sectors, competition, decay of centralism and state protection – all these 
result in market re-evaluation and restructuring of both sectoral and regional profiles. So, “within 
any given country, we find not one transition but many occurring in different domains – political, economic and social – and the temporality of these processes are often asynchronous...” (Stark, 
1992, p.19). The statement is even more relevant to the regional domains and diversity of intra-
Russian transition.  
Not surprisingly, Russia, according to D.L’vov (2001), has two different images at home and 
abroad: of a backward non-competitive and of a potentially rich country. L’vov shares the 
second notion, though ‘hidden’, while the first is grounded by another patriotically minded 
economist, A.Parshev in his book “Why Russia is not America” (2001). What looks funny, 
both views are neogeodetermined. L’vov strengthens Russia’s mineral wealth which is “twice 
as rich as the American” and makes, in form of rent, the 3/4 of pure profits (capital forms the 
1/5 and labour the 1/20). Parshev, in turn, argues that the severe climates (“we live where 
nobody else lives”) and long distances make Russian production too expensive to be efficient, 
competitive and attractive for foreign investors.  
The truth may lie somewhere in between. What we agree with, is the Parshev’s thesis that only 
15-20 million (some 20 percent) of the Russian able-bodied population can survive around 
relatively successful mining and material processing. The sectors and corresponding regions 
suffer from antidumping policies of our key partners, such as European Union, USA, India and 
even some CIS states. China alone was discriminated worse before the country joined WTrO, 
but the result can be doubtful for it, and the more so for Russia. 
These has been the conditions of Russia’s market adaptation during the last 10-15 years. The 
period seems insufficient to forecast what can happen with its economic space in the next 20-25 
years. On the other hand, the socio-economic landscape, with its West-East, North-South and 
centre-periphery (in particular) gradients or cleavages, is much more stable. Formed by 
decades, it consists of  regions likely living in different times. The styles of adaptation, either 
creating markets or adjusting passively, have widened the gaps.
v The prognostic horizon of 
Russian regional development is based on a typological approach, the more so that all 89 
subjects of the Federation form an excessive number and have to be unified in groups or 
macrotypes, such as the largest metropolitan areas, old-industrial semiperipheries, agrarian, 
resource-based and border regions. All these allows us to suggest two basic scenarios of future: 
•  An inertial development based on primary exports and modest import-substitution 
which requires state protectionism for manufacturers of selected goods (A). 
•  Emergence of a new Russian economy, aggressive innovative (R & D and hi-tech) 
activities along with and, perhaps, soon after the A scenario (B).    
The A version was realised, partly involuntarily, in 1993-97 under Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin 
rule. The industrial output gives an example of its spatial results. General decline had been 
escorted by divergence which increased even in 1997, the first year of a recovery, though 
broken by the 1998 default. The 5 to 10-fold gap between the top producing member of the 
Federation and his antipode in 1960-70s decreased  to 1.4 times in 1990 and grew again to a 
level of 2.5 times by the mid-90s. A profile across the country by major economic region gave 
another impression. Market restructuring in favour of mining and low-tech sectors resulted in a 
new eastern shift. The contribution of Siberia jumped up from 20 percent to 30 in the then 
prices. The old Centre headed by Moscow seeded its position to the mid-Russian Yamal–
Urals –Volga pivot (45% of industrial outputs and exports). However, the general variation 
index grew up due to the losses of weaker regions, branch manufacturing zones included. After 
1998, the rise of import-substitution began to shift the profile back westward, and the new 
tendency was only temporary interrupted in 2000, the year of very high oil prices.  
Basic theoretical combinations of major global trends and local variation (often used and 
differently called) are shown in the scheme below. The general trend of the 90s was regressive 
divergence, but the whole picture depended on sector and scale. A decay does not exclude 
cases of local growth, and vice versa. Any scheme simplifies reality; nevertheless, a rejection of 
the ‘Chernomyrdin model’ was promising and giving chances for manufacturing sectors as 
distributed much more regularly upon Russia’s territory.         
Typology of  general and local development trends   
General  (Global, National) Trend 
 
Progress (Development,  
improvement, growth, etc.) 
Regress (Deterioration,  
decay, decline, etc.) 
  Convergence   Progressive convergence (Levelling  Regressive convergence (Levelling Local 
(Regional) 
(Levelling, 
 equalisation, etc.) 
up,  
equal growth, etc. ) 
down,  
equalizing decline, etc.) 
Variation  Divergence  
(Differentiation, 
segregation etc.)  
Progressive divergence 




uneven decline, etc.) 
      
On the other hand the A scenario, in principle, cannot satisfy the national ambitions and mass 
expectations. So, we focus on the B alternative with its external and domestic preconditions. 
The former depend on medium-term global economic dynamics and claim an acceleration of  
some key hi-tech sectors and centres. The problem consists in the fact (or, at least, in our 
opinion) that Russia has practically lost its historical chance to enrol in the electronic-
informational half-Kondratieff (1975-2000) as a producer of e-technologies and e-techniques.  
This does not mean the absence of  Russian R & D base in the field which was developed 
initially in Kurchatov Atomic energy institute since 1982 (the first Russian Internet provider since 
1989) and later in other academic centres and in Zelenograd (Moscow satellite city, ‘Russian 
Silicon Valley’). Although the crisis impeded technical progress, the progress in use of  PC and 
global information network has been impressive since the late 90s.  
Different evaluations of, say, the Internet audience are normal practice depending on indicator 
and method. The number of Russian users in 2001-02 varied from 4.8 to 12.5   million. The 
larger figure belongs to the known Irish Nua Surveys and places Russia into a top world dozen 
but with relatively modest ‘penetration level’ (8.6 percent). According to some other surveys, 
36 million Russians are going to become the Internet users. The spatial dimension of Russian 
network is extremely irregular, 11 millionaire cities form 90 percent of its audience, with 35% in 
the two capitals. In Moscow, the share of those who are 16 or older and visit the Network at 
least once a month amounts to 15 percent.  
The national fragment of the global Net is extended from Saint Petersburg and Krasnodar to 
Vladivostok, but provinces look much more modest in number of users and providers, web 
sites, host and ordinary computers. The e-commerce still is concentrated in the capital cities (19 
among its 20  largest hosting providers are located Moscow and only 1 in Petersburg). At the same time, the e-technology and economy look extremely promising for Russian peripheries 
with their transport remoteness, if not isolation.    
In general terms, the spatial analysis of innovative activities reveals a system that includes centres 
of different size and specialization. Irrespective of their narrow R & D base and of the 
differences between market and centrally planned economies, we state that the geographical 
principles of  the innovation diffusion process were similar. These were the types of penetration 
(the so called frontal or hierarchical) and of areas, according to their role in the process 
(creative, adaptive or  conservative).  
In the USSR, the system of creative centres was closely connected with the institutional 
structure of science, because its fundamental sector was based not so much on the universities 
but on the research institutions of the Academy of  Science. The applied R & D facilities were 
organised mostly by Soviet industrial ministries many of  which were comparable with the largest 
western transnational corporations (in physical volume of outputs). The then created backbone 
of both polyfunctional and monofunctional specialised centres can play its role in contemporary 
and future spatial economic development. 
Three centres (agglomerations) of the former type are most important. They are Moscow, St. 
Petersburg and Novosibirsk. The next level of polyfunctional centres includes Nizhniy 
Novgorod, Samara, Kazan’, Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk, Omsk, Krasnoyarsk and some other. 
Combinations of different innovative activities at a lower scale are typical for each of them.
vi 
Monofunctional centres are more individual as often corresponding to the needs of military 
industrial sectors. The so called ‘closed’ defence cities (the two Soviet categories that may 
coincide or not), clearly demonstrate the hierarchical scheme of innovation diffusion. These cities 
seldom communicated with their vicinities and formed ‘negative zones of gravitation’. 
For all of them, advanced marketing and business plans will play decisive role, being oriented 
away from the former development models in order to be involved into contemporary chains of 
transnational reproduction. Unfortunately, many potential western investors regard such centres 
as competitors and try to replace them from the scene.
vii However, the examples of successful 
co-operation do exist in spacecraft and nuclear power fields. The budget-forming primary sectors will be an important source of domestic capital which has 
become more mobile, both sectorally and regionally. This is reflected by creation of some 
vertically integrated industrial companies and holdings (such as Russian Aluminium, Lukoil and 
Tyumen’ Oil Company) which try to restore the former long production chains and, thus, move 
west- and southward in order to take over manufacturing and R & D links in European Russia 
and in the CIS states. Quite similar tendencies are observed in food processing with its quick 
capital turnover and growing appetite for farms and land. Re-integration of the post-Soviet 
economic space has become a slogan of political and business elites, and popular topics on 
fragmented space, recent publications (Ruble et al., 2001) included, may look outdated.  
Generally speaking, the scenario B predict a combination of three basic tendencies: (1) 
redistribution of Russian capital from mining to manufacturing and R & D sectors concentrated 
in old centres and regions; (2) maintenance of resource areas at their present level with the help 
of re-investment and foreign participation, (3) import-substitution at the expense of high 
economic interest and macroeconomic regulation. For all benefits of the scenario which claims 
more adequate and advanced adaptation of Russian economy to the world market, the uneven 
regional development will inevitably affect this development (like any other) and request much 








                                                                 
i Presently uprising theoretical antiglobalism may remind that of the early 1970s, when A. 
Emmanuel (1972) and J. Amin (1974) criticised the neo-imperialism with the help of unequal 
exchange and accumulation models, partly Ricardian. M.Chisholm concluded in 1990: “For all the 
apparent solidity of the unequal exchange thesis in providing a mechanism for the systematic 
transfer of wealth from the poor to rich nations, closer inspection shows it to be based on the 
assumption that an hour’s work has the same worth irrespective of the circumstances under which 
that work is done. If that assumption is not accepted, the thesis fails.” (Chisholm, 1990, p. 188). 
We believe that the different circumstances are all alive and, moreover, the same. “In an 
advanced economy, <...> as capital investment occurs, the resulting production facility will embody 
the latest technology” (ibid., p. 71).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
ii We agree with A.Lushin and P.Oppenheimer (in Russia’ Post-Communist Economy, 2001, p. 
261) that Russia’s vast land mass and large (150 million) and well-educated population do not 
make it a candidate for self-sufficiency, and the reason lies not in the globalization of markets or in 
its demonstration effects, but in certain deeply rooted characteristics of Russia’s economy and 
society. 
 
iii  One hardly can imagine today, how low the tariffs were. A railway ticket for over 600 km 
Moscow – Leningrad journey remained the same during 1948-88, 11-12 roubles, while an average 
monthly salary rose from 60 to 240 roubles. It was at least ten times cheaper then, say an 
equidistant trip from Brighton to Glasgow, equivalent, in its turn, to a Moscow – Khabarovsk (near 
7,000 km) flight price., In July 2001 (after many inflation shocks, but before the next price jump in 
January 2000), the cheapest one way railway passenger prices from East Siberian or Far Eastern 
centres to Moscow or another European Russian city amounted to an average local dweller’s 
monthly income, or 3 to 4 times more than in the mid-80s. For the majority of provinces, except for 
the “rich” Muscovites, Samara and Surgut (Tyumen’ oil fields) dwellers alone, the rest of the 
country has become economically much more distant.       
iv Illegal re-exports of Russian fuels and metals via the Baltic seaports are the best known but not 
unique. Fuels legally exported to Ukraine (where the price trebled), from the neighbouring 
southern Russian regions grew by a factor of 6  in 1999 alone. Special high price petrol stations 
were established in Belgorod for the ‘strangers’ from Khar’kov, with glamour black markets 
nearby... 
 
v Regional strategies were analysed in many publications. The G. Marchenko’s (1996) types are: 
a) conservative-communist (basically agrarian), b)  national-liberal (urbanised), c) 
international-liberal  (gateway model), d)  lobbyist (searching federal support), e) separatist 
(republics bargaining with Moscow), and f)  paternalist-clientele model of most dependent 
regions. The scheme by V.Lysenko and V.Matveev (1998) deals with regional economic interests: 
1) mining-exporting, opened and liberal, 2) manufacturers interested in protected domestic market 
but protesting against  anti-inflation policy, 3) self-sufficient and partly self-isolated agrarian 
looking for survival, 4) some of republics with their elites playing ethnic card in order to keep their 
special economic regimes, 5) border regions interested in foreign trade and in search of an 
offshore development. Anyway, as many authors state, some largest and westernised centres, the 
islands of tertiary post-industrial economy in an ocean of primary and secondary economies 
(hyper-industrial included), depend on currency exchange rates, and the deep peripheries worry 
about weather and yield of potatoes. These mental gaps provide Russia’s political scene with the 
stable spatial structure (well-known in political science) which makes almost any election 
regionally predictable rather than unexpected.  
 
vi  Their sectoral structures and levels depend, among other factors, on geographical position. For 
instance, N. Novgorod, the millionaire city located too close to Moscow, evidently cedes its 
position to Novosibirsk and Yekaterinburg in terms of e-developments.  
 
vii  In such cases, there will be no other way but military exports. For instance, in aircraft industries 
(over 50 percent of Russia’s export of this kind), the eastern Russian centres which work for 
Chinese and Indian armies etc. feel much better than the holdings in European Russia which can 
produce huge civic aeroplanes but are in a deep depression due to competition of Airbus Industries                                                                                                                                                                                                   
and Boeing and to their protection in the West. However, this sector still is mentioned as 
internationally competitive (Lushin and Oppenheimer, 2001, p. 261). The Baltic and Northern 
shipyards after a deep decline (to 9 percent by 1997) could compensate it and elevate the output 
by 2 -4 times making metal-intensive bodies of vessels and oil platforms in co-operation with the 
western partners.  